The AFRICA Space with Nina: North to Sahel to the Horn.. Chaos Supreme

MENAUncensored avatar
MENA UNCENSORED
@MENAUncensoredJan 23, 2026

The Spaces convened by host Layla with co-host Nina surveyed North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, mapping political alignments, resource stakes, and strategic chokepoints. Layla outlined normalization dynamics in North Africa (Morocco’s ties with Israel; Tunisia’s instability; Libya’s split; Egypt’s fragile status) and positioned Algeria as vocally pro-Palestinian yet economically interlinked with Europe. The discussion emphasized the Sahel’s belt (Mauritania to Sudan) and the Horn’s critical waterways, especially Bab el-Mandeb, with Djibouti’s dense foreign basing and Somalia’s fragmented governance (Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland). Nina detailed UAE, Turkish, and Saudi footprints, alleged RSF/UAEsupported violence in Sudan and spillover into Chad, and the quiet roles of Kenya and Ethiopia, with Abiy Ahmed and the GERD portrayed as leverage over Nile states. Layla framed Chad as a transit hub for mercenaries and pressure across Sudan, Libya, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger. The emerging Sahel alliance of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger was cast as a potential nucleus for African economic sovereignty, clashing with Western and other external interests. The session also flagged AfCFTA’s rescheduled meeting amid global tensions and Saudi moves to secure Red Sea trade by engaging Sudan. It closed with a note to examine Turkey’s Africa role next week.

Africa Space (Wednesday): Sahel, North Africa, Horn of Africa — Overview and Geopolitics

Participants and Roles

  • Layla (host, “uncensored”): framed the session, shared a color-coded regional map, guided topic flow, and set the weekly schedule.
  • Nina (co-host; North African): led the Horn of Africa and Sahel deep dive; focused on port geopolitics, foreign bases, and Nile/GERD dynamics.
  • Other mentioned or briefly engaged participants: Ramsay (greeted at start), Meds, Fabian (North African), Matt (invited), Shiki (present), “sister CD” (referenced for prior work on Somaliland), Charming (participant; brief off-topic intervention), plus general audience.

Format and Schedule

  • New weekly Africa Space with Nina as co-host, every Wednesday (times announced for NYC, GMT, Beirut, Netherlands).
  • This session intended as a one-hour foundational overview to be used as a stepping stone for future Africa spaces; next topic announced: Turkey’s role in Africa (Bayraktar, arms trade, etc.).

Map-Based Regional Framing (Layla)

Layla shared a color-coordinated map and outlined regions and country groupings:

  • North Africa (Green): Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt.
  • Sahel (between two red strips): Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Sudan; with linkages to Central African states.
  • Horn of Africa: Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia; highlighted Somaliland (Pink) as a sub-entity within Somalia.
  • Central Africa (Yellow circles): Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) — described as areas of concentrated poverty and contested by outside powers, bordering Sudan and connecting toward Chad and Nigeria; presented as a “central base” crucial for controlling wider dynamics.

North Africa: Political Alignments and Instability

Key Points (Layla)

  • Morocco: described as pro-normalization with Israel and steady in that stance.
  • Tunisia: framed as “in shambles,” with governance influenced by Muslim Brotherhood; political instability noted.
  • Libya: split between two governments:
    • UN- and Turkey/Qatar-backed government (“Muslim Brotherhood” aligned, per host’s characterization).
    • Haftar-led government (backed by Abu Dhabi/UAE), with a persistent division and no near-term stability.
  • Egypt: long-standing ties with Israel at the state level; societal resistance to normalization is asserted, with references to past Muslim Brotherhood-led government (Morsi) and current Sisi leadership; Layla discussed claims of external efforts (including “Americans using Muslim Brotherhood”) to destabilize, and speculation about Israeli strategic ambitions toward Sinai and Cairo.
  • Algeria: emphasized as vocally pro-Palestinian and the largest, resource-rich North African state (precious metals, rare earths, hydrocarbons).
    • Despite strong rhetoric, Layla argued Algeria’s exports to Europe include trade partners dealing with Israel, complicating boycott claims.
    • Security posture: Nina highlighted Algeria’s significant defense budget (cited $25B for 2026), readiness due to shared borders across the Sahel (Mali, Mauritania, Libya, Niger) and anticipated regional threats.
    • Protest infiltration (2019): Layla recounted attempts by Muslim Brotherhood and “Zio elements” to influence Algerian protests, citing citizen-led detentions of infiltrators and cooperation with police.

Diaspora Experience (Algerian participant)

  • One participant (unnamed) referenced the “Black Decade” and colonial legacies, reflecting on heavy losses and current racist incidents in France affecting Algerian-origin youth, highlighting sensitivities around Algeria’s security and diaspora challenges.

Sahel: Geography, Resource Competition, and External Actors

Geographic Clarification (Layla)

  • East-to-west enumeration: Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea; note on distinctions (e.g., Benin often mis-added to Sahel; Nigeria is below but not part of the Sahel belt).
  • Two tiers: North Africa on top (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), with Sahel directly beneath (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Sudan) and linkages toward Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia.

Conflict Drivers and Gateways (Layla & Nina)

  • Layla’s central thesis: The Sahel is partitioned in practice by major powers (US, France, UK, Israel, Russia, China), intensifying conflict over hydrocarbons (oil, gas), coal, gold, copper, cobalt, bauxite, and rare earths (notably cobalt for EV batteries).
  • Chad as linchpin (“the screw”):
    • Described as the gateway linking conflicts in Sudan, Libya, Nigeria, Niger, and Mali.
    • Mercenary flows via Chad to Darfur and beyond; mentions of Wagner and other foreign elements traversing porous routes.
  • Sudan: ongoing war, media silence; RSF (Rapid Support Forces) characterized by Nina as UAE-backed, involved in cross-border incursions into Chad.
    • Nina cited episodes where RSF crossed into Chad, claiming pursuit of Sudanese army; she alleged such “excuses” conceal a bid to create operational footholds. One incident reportedly killed seven Chadian soldiers, prompting warnings.
  • Benin–Burkina Faso axis: Nina alleged renewed French presence under cover of coup-related instability and “proxy” threats, describing a broader neo-colonial push to reassert control in the Sahel west.
  • Nigeria: Layla described a manufactured Muslim–Christian divide (citing Boko Haram in the north) and linked US/UK/Israeli influence to coup dynamics; emphasized Nigeria’s strategic value (US bomber basing considerations under Trump).

Emerging Alliance in the Western Sahel (Layla & Nina)

  • Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger: reported formation of a military and economic alliance (unity framework including an anthem and plans for a shared bank and currency).
    • Layla compared it to the Benelux nucleus for Europe, positing a nucleus for a new African Union focused on retaining African wealth and fair pricing.
    • Burkina Faso’s nationalization of gold mines was cited as a watershed move angering France (noted for large gold reserves without domestic mines).
    • Security risk: multiple attempts on Burkina Faso’s leader Ibrahima Traoré were noted (Layla referenced four attempts), with Russia ties implied (images of Traoré with Putin).

Horn of Africa: Ports, Bases, Clans, and the Nile

Somalia and Sub-entities (Nina)

  • Complex internal divisions: Somalia (federal government), Puntland, and Somaliland.
    • Clan dynamics within Somaliland (Isaaq clan mentioned) and reports of subgroup splits.
    • A separate “state” reportedly requested to join Somalia’s federal government (Nina referenced an “assured state”).
  • Djibouti: pivotal micro-state at the junction of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, hosting numerous foreign military bases despite small population; serves as a strategic choke point.
  • Ethiopia and Kenya: characterized as “silent partners” aligned with US/western strategy, used as strategic backstops for operations in the Horn and Sahel.
  • UAE and Berbera port (Somaliland): described as a logistics corridor reaching deeper into the Sahel and implicated in funding RSF operations in Sudan.
  • Turkey’s footprint:
    • One of the largest Turkish bases outside Turkey in Somalia.
    • Ongoing military training and exercises with Somalian forces.
    • Cooperation on space assets (Nina cited three satellites launched in partnership with Somalia), highlighting data surveillance and military-territorial capabilities.

Nile/GERD as Strategic Lever (Nina & Layla)

  • Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD):
    • Nina framed the Nile as the core objective for western strategy; Ethiopia used as mechanism to pressure Egypt from the south.
    • Layla acknowledged Ethiopia’s right to water/food security but emphasized the downstream risks; asserted Israeli support for GERD completion, and warned that opening the dam’s gates could devastatingly flood downstream communities (Sudan, Egypt and villages along the Nile).
    • Political leadership: Layla described PM Abiy Ahmed as closely cooperating with US/Israel and alleged willingness to participate in regional military agendas.

Red Sea Security and Saudi Positioning (Layla)

  • Saudi Arabia’s stakes:
    • Longest Red Sea shoreline; petrochemical and oil export routes reliant on secure Bab el-Mandeb and Suez.
    • Ports and industrial hubs (e.g., Jeddah and major petrochemical complexes near Red Sea) make eastern African stability vital.
  • Strategic moves:
    • Buying Sudanese gold (partly framed in context of UAE–Saudi rivalry over Sudan’s gold flows via RSF).
    • Supporting Somali unity; resisting fragmentation into Somaliland/Puntland/Somalia.
    • Deepening ties with Egypt and Sudan; defense cooperation with Pakistan as an adjunct link to Sudan.

AF CFTA: Trade Integration under Geopolitical Pressure

Updates and Perspectives (Nina & Layla)

  • AF CFTA (African Continental Free Trade Area): launched by African Union, with free trade objectives across borders.
    • Nigeria identified as a major partner.
    • Nina connected its conceptual genealogy to early 2000s Chinese free-trade ideas, aiming to facilitate investment and export across allied economies.
  • Rescheduling: Official announcement to push a planned meeting by about a month, coinciding with WEF week in Davos.
    • Nina interpreted the delay as aligning with shifting power structures and assessing western and multipolar moves.
    • Layla suggested they are waiting to finalize certain agreements and to see global geopolitical decisions before locking in timelines.
  • Risk environment: Layla warned of impending smear campaigns and external obstruction against any credible steps toward stronger intra-African trade and unified tariff frameworks (minimal costs, integrated market).
  • Davos/BlackRock aside: Nina noted a sentiment that western firms face trust deficits; Layla referenced public comments by BlackRock’s leadership about rebuilding trust.

Central Africa: Congo/DRC as a Critical Junction (Layla)

  • Framed as a poverty hotspot under strong external influence, bordering Sudan with a “back gate” toward Chad and Nigeria.
  • Control of Central Africa portrayed as essential for broader continental influence; external support and proxy operations alleged.

Foreign Influence and Neo-Colonial Structures (Nina & Layla)

  • Persistent neo-colonial practices: Nina urged checking mining company boards across African states, asserting that a large majority are owned or influenced by western/“Zionist” interests (US, France, Norway), limiting true autonomy over resources.
  • External actors named across discussions: US, France, UK, Israel, Russia (Wagner), China, Turkey, UAE, Saudi Arabia, India; all depicted as competing for strategic corridors, bases, minerals, and political leverage.

Media Silence and Information Control (Layla & Nina)

  • Thesis: “The war you don’t hear about is the most dangerous,” with Africa’s conflicts often under-reported unless externally convenient.
  • Both speakers emphasized that ongoing Sudan conflict and wider Sahel/Horn crises are muted in mainstream media to conceal active geopolitical operations.

Off-Topic Interjection and Host’s Refocus

  • Charming briefly raised Russia-related points (frozen assets, grain deal framing), and frustrations around global complicity; Layla refocused the space firmly on Africa.

Closing and Next Steps

  • Layla closed with reminders on vigilance and critical thinking, reiterating the weekly scheduling and Nina’s co-hosting role.
  • Announced next Wednesday’s focus: Turkey’s role in Africa (Bayraktar, arms trade, broader presence).

Highlights and Key Takeaways

  • Foundational mapping of North Africa, Sahel, and Horn of Africa, emphasizing how ports, waterways (Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb), and the Nile shape security and trade.
  • Sahel’s instability tied to resource competition and cross-border mercenary flows, with Chad described as the central conduit.
  • Western Sahel alliance (Burkina Faso–Mali–Niger) presented as a nascent nucleus for deeper African integration, challenging traditional external dominance.
  • Horn of Africa dynamics involve multilayered local fragmentation (Somalia) and intense foreign military-economic footprints (Djibouti bases, UAE/Turkey roles, Ethiopia GERD pressures on Egypt/Sudan).
  • AF CFTA seen as a critical mechanism for African economic sovereignty, but subject to geopolitical headwinds and potential disinformation/smear campaigns.