Friday's Weekly Space: Another SCOOP on Anthony Aguilar & GHF's Lies

The Spaces examines the background and public claims of Anthony Aguilar, a former U.S. Army service member now connected to GHF, and probes inconsistencies in his rank history and field testimony. Host Layla and guest analyst “Critical” reconstruct Aguilar’s career using open-source images: First Lieutenant in 2006 with the 172nd Stryker Brigade in Iraq; by 2007 a broadcast officer with the 302nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment; and by 2015–2017 a Major linked to 3rd Special Forces Group/USASOC activities in Central Asia and at Best Ranger. They argue broadcast officers conduct strategic communications shaping public perceptions of war. Turning to GHF, they highlight contradictions in Aguilar’s account of an incident involving a child (“Amir/Abu”)—noting he alternately places it at Sites 1–3 near the Kerem Shalom crossing and dates it to May 28, whereas Site 3 reportedly opened May 29. They also question his stated role (taking photos/video for a Google Drive allegedly accessed by an Israeli journalist) and why he remained on-site after claiming daily atrocities. Speakers frame these issues within broader information operations (Greater Middle East Project, DARPA-style data flooding) and report severe platform disruptions during the Space, proposing mitigation steps and further documentation.

Exposé on Anthony Aguilar, GHF, and information operations

Participants and roles

• Layla (host; MENA Uncensored): Convened the session, framed the investigative scope, directed the flow, and emphasized caution and verification.
• Critical (guest investigator; also referred to as “critical”/“Critical Canadian”): Presented open-source findings on Anthony Aguilar’s military career and later involvement around GHF.
• Co-host (female; name not explicitly confirmed on-air): Managed co-hosting/logistics, contributed a perspective on DARPA-style information tactics, and proposed operational steps to mitigate platform interference.
• Others referenced: Sister Nina (credited by Critical for help on rank identification; presence implied), Shawn “the Architect,” Cheryl, Sister Charming, Kevin, Alexa, and others listening.

Purpose and context of the Space

The session aimed to scrutinize the credibility of Anthony Aguilar (former US Army officer) and his public allegations related to GHF (Global Humanitarian Fund; spokesperson cited as Chapin Fay). The hosts framed Aguilar as potentially part of a deliberate narrative operation intended to sow doubt about credible on-the-ground Palestinian testimonies and future whistleblowers. They planned a step-by-step evidence-led presentation, beginning with verifiable career records before addressing claims tied to Gaza distribution sites.

Documented timeline of Anthony Aguilar’s military career (open-source images/posts cited)

• 2006 (Iraq, likely Mosul): Image on a US military media site (DVIDS) shows Aguilar as a First Lieutenant with the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team. Caption notes an IED incident and that his eye protection prevented injury. Role implies junior leadership at the platoon/company level.
• 2007 (Fort Dix, New Jersey): Image dated April 19, 2007, shows Aguilar still as a First Lieutenant but now designated as a Broadcast Officer with the 302nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD), headquartered in California. This indicates a transition from line-unit leadership to public affairs/broadcast operations.
• 2015 (Central Asia—Tajikistan/Kazakhstan context): Photos circulating on Facebook portray Aguilar associated with 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) [3rd SFG(A)], including activities with students in Central Asia and an image shaking hands with then–Secretary of State John Kerry (Nov 3, 2015). Comment threads suggest he had “finally made major,” implying promotion around that timeframe and possible periods of absence from public view.
• 2017 (Fort Benning, Georgia): Captioned image (April 7, 2017) references “US Army Ranger Major Anthony Aguilar” assigned to USASOC (US Army Special Operations Command) participating in the Best Ranger Competition. This confirms he remained a Major at least through 2017.
• 2017–2025: Critical states Aguilar retired during this interval. Whether he was later promoted (e.g., to LTC) or experienced a demotion remains unclear from available open-source material.

Rank structure clarification and promotion tempo questions

• Layla clarified the US Army officer rank sequence: 1LT → CPT → MAJ → LTC (Lieutenant Colonel). “Lieutenant Major” is not a US Army rank; the correct title is Major.
• Observations and questions raised:
  • 2006: 1LT
  • ~2007: 1LT (Broadcast Officer)
  • ~2015: Promoted to Major (per social media comments), still a Major in 2017
  • Open questions: If Aguilar later presented himself or was introduced as LTC, when did that promotion occur? If he claimed LTC earlier, was there a demotion? Alternately, was the LTC label a mischaracterization? The time-to-rank progression (1LT to MAJ over roughly 8–10 years) is plausible, but any subsequent demotion/promotion remains unverified.

Public Affairs/Broadcast role and information operations context

• Critical emphasized that a Broadcast Officer in MPAD functions within military public affairs and information operations (IO), including crisis communication, narrative framing, and media engagement.
• He linked Aguilar’s later 3rd SFG(A) association to the broader “Greater Middle East Project,” referencing think-tank origins (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) and Condoleezza Rice’s “new Middle East” via “controlled chaos” framing. Assertions included:
  • IO methods: diplomatic pressure, direct interventions, training of local partners, public diplomacy/media campaigns, and heavy funding of civil society and independent media.
  • 3rd SFG(A) was portrayed as instrumental in training local forces, reducing overt US footprint, intelligence gathering, and clandestine operations across West Asia and Africa. Note: These are characterizations offered by Critical; they reflect his analysis rather than a formal government description.

Aguilar’s GHF-related narrative: roles, interviews, and data handling claims

• Per Critical, Aguilar said he was approached by “UG Solutions” (UGS) and later appeared on Chris Hedges’ program. Aguilar described initial misgivings about the operation, yet claimed he proceeded “for the kids.”
• Tasking: Aguilar reportedly said he was assigned to capture photos and videos at sites and upload them to a Google Drive; he alleges the link was provided to an Israeli journalist who accessed the full repository, not only his folder. Critical noted no subsequent public reporting traceable to that data trove.
• Imagery gap: Apart from a single photo of Aguilar with others, Critical reported not finding images of him at actual distribution sites, distributions, or direct incidents.

Inconsistencies and contested points in Aguilar’s Gaza account

• Site designation drift: Aguilar’s story about a boy (“Amir,” also referenced as “Abu”) was, at different times, linked to Site 1, Site 2, and ultimately Site 3.
• Date vs. opening status: Critical cited a Jerusalem Post report indicating Site 3 did not open until May 29. Aguilar claims his pivotal incident occurred on May 28—creating a mismatch if the event is anchored to Site 3. If the event were at Site 1 (Kerem Shalom/Karam Abu Salem area) or Site 2, the timeline could align better, but Critical stressed Aguilar’s more recent emphasis on Site 3.
• Frequency of atrocities vs. resignation timing: Aguilar has claimed he witnessed atrocities “every day” yet says the 28th incident spurred his resignation; Critical noted he appeared to stay on for nearly a month thereafter, asking why, if atrocities were daily and documentation was his task, more evidence was not surfaced contemporaneously.
• Early access explanation: The co-host suggested “Abu Shabab gang” (described as a network of Palestinian collaborators) had privileged early access, which could reconcile certain timing discrepancies. This is a claim and remains unverified within the Space.
• Data custody: Aguilar’s claim about a Google Drive given to an Israeli journalist is uncorroborated by published output; the chain of custody, permissions, and any compromise of the repository remain unclear.

Allegations regarding GHF and spokesperson Chapin Fay

• Layla alleged GHF-operated distribution “camps” functioned as data-collection sites and were associated with grievous harm to Palestinians, using the term “concentration camps.” She contended Aguilar’s media presence serves to cast doubt on credible Palestinian testimonies and current/future whistleblowers.
• These are allegations presented by the hosts; independent corroboration was not presented during the Space.

Claims of platform interference and session management

• Multiple participants experienced disconnects, inability to hear speakers, and notifications stating the Space had “ended,” despite it still running. Layla characterized it as a targeted disruption linked to the Space’s title referencing Aguilar and GHF, alleging involvement of GHF, Israeli, and CIA-linked actors.
• Operational responses considered:
  • Reposting/retweeting the Space to fight suppression
  • Temporarily changing the title to reduce targeted interference
  • Running 10-minute segments with alternating hosts and keeping all under the MENA Uncensored umbrella for later pinning and continuity
  • Closing and reopening the Space to restore functionality

DARPA/IO playbook hypothesis (co-host’s perspective)

• The co-host described, from personal exposure, a DARPA-style tactic that floods systems with “garbage data” to obscure valuable signals, likening it to the current information environment where contradictory, low-quality testimonies could be introduced to discredit real whistleblowers.
• She argued major platforms (Twitter/X, Facebook) have DARPA lineage and suggested such IO approaches are migrating from cyberspace to the field (e.g., Russia/Ukraine, Gaza), positing Aguilar as a “patsy” inserted to create confusion and bait others into discrediting traps.

Key takeaways

• Verifiable career baseline:
  • 2006: 1LT, 172nd Stryker BCT (Iraq)
  • 2007: 1LT, Broadcast Officer, 302nd MPAD
  • 2015: Social indications of promotion to Major; 3rd SFG(A)–linked imagery; handshake with Sec. John Kerry
  • 2017: Major, USASOC, Best Ranger Competition
  • Retirement occurred between 2017–2025 (exact date and terminal rank unverified)
• Public Affairs/IO footprint: Aguilar’s documented Broadcast Officer role and later 3rd SFG(A) association situate him in domains where narrative management is a core function.
• GHF account discrepancies: Site number changes, a cited opening date conflict for Site 3 (May 29) vs. an alleged May 28 incident, and a persistence on mission after declaring a breaking-point atrocity, all raise credibility questions according to the hosts and Critical.
• Evidence gap: Despite claims of daily atrocities and tasked media capture, limited imagery has surfaced; the alleged Google Drive leak to an Israeli journalist has not yielded publicly traceable outputs.
• Information warfare framing: Hosts interpret Aguilar’s visibility as an IO tool to seed doubt and dilute credible Palestinian testimony, paralleling described DARPA “data flooding” tactics.
• Platform friction: The Space experienced unusual disruptions; hosts attribute this to targeted suppression.

Open questions and verification needs

• Terminal rank and retirement details: Was Aguilar ever a Lieutenant Colonel? If so, when? Any documented demotion?
• Site timelines: Independent confirmation of Site 1/2/3 activation dates and operations schedules; cross-check with multiple sources beyond the cited Jerusalem Post item.
• Chain of custody for media: Can the alleged Google Drive, sharing logs, or journalist recipient be independently verified? Any published pieces using that material?
• Incident documentation: Are there time-stamped photos/videos, manifests, or third-party reports that correlate with the “Amir/Abu” incident on May 28? Which site precisely, and who else was present?
• GHF operations: Independent audits or credible on-the-ground documentation that corroborate or refute allegations of harm, coercion, or data harvesting at distribution sites.
• Platform interference: Logs or forensic indicators that distinguish systemic glitches from targeted suppression.

Sources and references mentioned in-session

• DVIDS (Defense Visual Information Distribution Service) imagery for 2006 and 2007
• Facebook photos/comments linking Aguilar to 3rd SFG(A) and the Nov 3, 2015 John Kerry handshake
• Best Ranger Competition 2017 media (USASOC attribution)
• Jerusalem Post report on Site 3 opening (cited for May 29 date)
• Chris Hedges interview with Anthony Aguilar
• “Unexpected” podcast episode where Aguilar displayed a map of sites
• General background references to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and early-2000s US policy framing (Condoleezza Rice’s “new Middle East”/“controlled chaos” rhetoric)

Operational notes from the hosts

• The hosts proposed: retitling, short segmented sessions, alternating hosts, and consolidating under MENA Uncensored for discoverability. They closed the Space to relaunch and continue the investigation with a more resilient format.