Friday 2: ATTACKED BY ZIO BOTS= SCOOP exposing GHF & Anthony Aguilar

The Spaces centers on a critical dissection of a media narrative around Anthony Aguilar and the NGO GHF, framed as an information operation targeting Western audiences. Host Leila and co-host NY outline alleged discrepancies in Aguilar’s claimed 25-year U.S. Army service (rank progression math, enlist/retirement dates, and role), asserting he worked in Army media/broadcast rather than Special Forces. They argue a PR actor, “Chap & Fei,” launched a crisis-PR shop with unusually high-profile clients (e.g., Palantir, Google, IBM) to orchestrate a “savior whistleblower” arc: feed widely known facts, insert a pivotal falsehood (notably around a child named Amir), and thereby contaminate past evidence of abuses linked to GHF sites. The team sketches a 2025 timeline: a failed Geneva registration for GHF, early operations and media seeding, and recycled influencers (including Richard Kemp) to segment Western demographics. A strong psy-ops context is cited (DARPA, university pipelines). Ground rules for the Space are set (no donation soliciting, Gaza reporters prioritized). The session ends with an internal dispute over prematurely signaling an NGO angle (not WCK, per Leila), stressing team verification and credibility before publication.

Twitter Space Notes: Alleged GHF propaganda apparatus, Anthony Aguilar background scrutiny, and internal moderation/process

Participants and roles inferred

  • Host and primary speaker: Leila (Speaker 1). She moderates the space, sets participation rules, and leads the investigative narrative.
  • Co-host: Identified by Leila as NY (Speaker 2). He contributes analysis on influence operations and PR actors; a brief on-air disagreement occurs with Leila about what to disclose.
  • Others referenced (not substantive speakers in this segment): Alexa, Shimine/Shameen (name unclear), Azim, Muhammad, Critical (a user invited to rejoin), Brother Hanny/Hany, Brother Emma (possibly another team member). Names were mentioned informally; their identities are not established in this excerpt.

Housekeeping and moderation policy

  • Technical issues: Initial co-host permissions were glitchy until Leila made a device change; recording confirmed active.
  • Participation control: Leila states a strict policy against microphone requests from accounts claiming to be in Gaza unless they are verifiable reporters. She emphasizes:
    • No donation solicitations via mic; those who persist will be blocked.
    • Links can be shared in the thread, but repeated mic requests for fundraising will be denied.
    • Rationale: Protect credibility, reduce spam, and prioritize safety of on-the-ground reporters whom she calls critically endangered.

Core narrative asserted by Leila about GHF and Anthony Aguilar (claims)

Leila advances a multi-part allegation that an information operation is being run around GHF, with Anthony Aguilar positioned as a crafted whistleblower figure whose background and story contain inconsistencies. Key points:

  • Service timeline and rank progression discrepancies (her reconstruction):

    • Aguilar is said to claim 25 years in the US Army.
    • Leila reconstructs a typical officer timeline: First Lieutenant → Captain (3 years), Captain → Major (4 years), Major → Lieutenant Colonel (~5 years) for a total of ~12 years from 1LT to LTC.
    • She anchors a date: Aguilar is referenced as First Lieutenant in 2006, then adds 12 years to reach 2018 as an expected LTC retirement mark. From 2018 to 2025 is 7 years, summing to 19 years; she argues 6 years are unaccounted for if the total is 25.
    • She raises questions: Did he join around 2000? What was his age then? When exactly did he retire? Why no clear enlistment/retirement dates in his public narrative?
  • Possible identity confusion:

    • Leila presents (via a post placed in the nest) two images of Aguilar from 2006 and 2025, plus an image of another First Lieutenant named Anthony Aguilar from Fort Knox in 2007.
    • She notes facial differences and entertains the possibility of two contemporaneous Anthony Aguilars at similar rank, but argues the better-documented Green Beret might be the other one, while the current media figure worked in broadcasting/propaganda.
  • Claimed actual function: propaganda/broadcast, not special forces

    • Attributed to a researcher handle (isotheraddicted): documentation that Aguilar worked in the US Army media/broadcast department, and in crisis management roles, rather than as a Green Beret. She allows that any Green Beret link could have been a short stint, but maintains the primary track is propaganda/broadcast.
    • Language note: Although he references Iraq, she questions how he had no Arabic if he had meaningful contact with local populations (she concedes it is possible if he had little civilian contact).
  • Placement within a PR and mercenary ecosystem (alleged):

    • She links Aguilar to GHF’s propaganda team and to entities she names as UG Solutions / Safe Rich Solutions and similar companies that provide security subcontractors (she characterizes them as mercenaries paid roughly 6,000–12,000 USD per week).
    • She claims these contractors, alongside Israeli forces, were filmed at GHF centers engaging in violence, and that such footage existed prior to Aguilar’s emergence.
  • Media makeover and audience targeting (alleged strategy):

    • She claims Aguilar received a makeover between earlier photos and 2025 appearances: a Hollywood tan, visible hairline contrast, blue-eyed aesthetic designed to appeal to Western audiences.
    • She argues the campaign targets US and broader Western constituencies, not local audiences, with an aim to inoculate these audiences against future criticism of GHF by associating negative claims with a now-celebrity whistleblower figure.
  • Narrative technique: mixing confirmed facts with a central falsehood

    • She argues Chapin Fay’s role was not to delete past content but to cast doubt on pre-existing, widely seen material (e.g., Palestinians’ and mercenaries’ own videos), by pushing a figure who would repeat known truths and then insert a ‘poison pill’ — e.g., the emotive story of a child named Amir.
    • After building credibility through mainstream and social media (including paid placements), Aguilar becomes a darling for smaller platforms, making critique costly due to his protective fanbase.
  • The pre-recorded video claim (location and staging):

    • Leila alleges a pre-recorded video was shot at an Israeli military post/HQ in Rafah, specifically within the Abu Shabab compound, with claims of coordination with the child’s mother and stepmother.
    • She scrutinizes cues like the child kissing Aguilar’s hands and the stepmother’s face covering (interpreted as identity concealment), posing questions about authenticity and staging.
  • Bottom line of Leila’s assertion: Aguilar is primarily a propagandist and crisis manager embedded in a larger influence operation, not a career Green Beret; his military timeline is inconsistent; and his media profile is part of a plan to cast doubt on documented abuses at GHF-linked sites.

Chapin Fay and the alleged PR/influence architecture

  • Corporate setup and client roster (claims by Leila):

    • Chapin Fay launched a PR firm called Lighthouse in Nov 2024, described as covering crisis management, lobbying, and media. Leila contends it anomalously launched with a heavy roster of blue-chip clients — Palantir, Google, IBM, banking giants, and political figures — which she argues is atypical even for top UK firms.
    • She connects those clients to technologies allegedly complicit in Israeli operations (e.g., Palantir/Google mentions), and frames Lighthouse as set up months before GHF was established in Feb 2025 to be ready to manage the narrative.
  • Objective of the PR push (per Leila):

    • Not clean-and-delete, but to seed doubt about prior stories and videos so that audiences hesitate to accept them as credible. Aguilar’s persona is used to validate known info, then insert discrediting elements.
  • Speaker 2 (NY) on influence ops and para-state capacity:

    • He argues figures like Fay operate in the orbit of national security without formal service records, acting as civilian veils for government spending on covert influence/psychological warfare.
    • He urges listeners to research DARPA, Red Balloon, and the academic pipeline breeding psychological operations talent, asserting decades-long US investment in psywar.
  • Recycling of influencers to prolong narratives:

    • Both speakers reference figures like Richard Kemp (UK ex-military), a Reverend Moore, j woods, and a group of 10 so-called influencers branded as journalists. They argue diverse personas were selected to reach different Western demographic segments (e.g., LGBTQ, legal, military).
    • Leila says when earlier faces were exposed (e.g., Richard Kemp), ‘bigger guns’ like Chapin Fay were rolled out; later Aguilar was introduced. Speaker 2 adds this recycling is intentional to extend the conflict narrative.

GHF timeline and registration claims

  • Formation and Geneva registration (claims):

    • Leila says her team learned in Jan–Feb 2025 that CIA and Mossad were preparing to set up an organization; in March they exposed that GHF applied for registration in Geneva.
    • She claims Switzerland refused registration due to lack of humanitarian credibility given alleged intelligence involvement, forcing GHF to stick to a US registration path.
  • Operations cadence and early exposures:

    • She places GHF operational ramp-up around March–May. She says her team exposed GHF early, prompting leadership changes and replacement of public faces.
  • Financials:

    • Leila references an initial 12 million USD and describes the early spend as eyebrow-raising, but Speaker 2 declines to go into details due to ongoing work and concerns about others copying their research before publication.

Evidence cited in-space (as presented; not independently verified here)

  • Images in the nest: comparative photos of Aguilar across years and another 2007 Fort Knox 1LT Anthony Aguilar.
  • Publicly circulated videos: Palestinians, mercenaries, and Israeli forces allegedly recorded at GHF sites; said to predate Aguilar’s media appearances.
  • Documents cited by a researcher handle (isotheraddicted): indicating Aguilar’s broadcast/propaganda role and crisis management background.

Moderation boundaries and credibility concerns

  • Leila reiterates the need for disciplined disclosures to maintain team credibility and safety of sources, and to avoid misleading audiences with premature or incomplete claims.
  • A tense exchange occurs when Speaker 2 thanks Steve Susby and references World Central Kitchen (WCK) and José Andrés in the context of recurring influence figures. Leila pushes back strongly:
    • She says the matter is not about WCK and hints at something larger; she admonishes that new claims should be coordinated internally before broadcast to avoid jeopardizing the mission.
    • Speaker 2 responds that some material was already posted publicly; Leila insists on process discipline and ends the exchange.

Open questions the speakers raised or implied

  • Anthony Aguilar’s verified service record:
    • Exact enlistment and retirement dates; confirmation of rank progression; whether two contemporaneous Anthony Aguilars existed; which one, if any, was Green Beret versus broadcast/propaganda.
  • Provenance and location of the pre-recorded video featuring the child Amir:
    • Confirmation of filming at an Israeli post in Rafah (Abu Shabab compound); verification of participants’ identities and any staging.
  • Corporate and registry facts about GHF:
    • Documentary confirmation of Geneva application and refusal; governance, fund flows, and relationships with contractors alleged to be mercenaries (UG Solutions, Safe Rich Solutions, and others).
  • Lighthouse client roster and contracts:
    • Independent validation of client lists, scopes of work, and any links to state-linked information operations.
  • The broader influencer program:
    • The full list of the 10 influencer-journalists; the nature and funding of their campaigns; measurement of audience impact.

Key takeaways (as stated by speakers; treat as claims pending verification)

  • A coordinated information operation is alleged around GHF, designed to discredit existing documentation of abuses at GHF-linked sites by inserting a celebrity whistleblower who blends widely known truths with a strategically placed falsehood.
  • Anthony Aguilar’s background and timeline are characterized as inconsistent, with an alternative portrayal of him as a propaganda/broadcast/crisis management operative rather than a career Green Beret.
  • Chapin Fay’s PR firm is asserted to be purpose-built for crisis management of this file, launching with unusually elite clients and operating as a civilian veil for national-security-adjacent influence operations.
  • The campaign appears tailored to Western audiences using aesthetic and emotional hooks (especially child-centered stories) and a rotating roster of influencers to maintain narrative momentum.
  • The hosting team emphasizes internal vetting and timing of disclosures to protect credibility and investigative integrity.

Next steps and action posture (from the speakers)

  • Continue investigation into:
    • Aguilar’s service records and identity matching.
    • GHF’s registration history, governance, and financial flows (early 12M spend flagged but details withheld pending publication).
    • Lighthouse’s clients and potential ties to state-linked psywar infrastructure.
    • The influencer pipeline and recycling patterns (including figures like Richard Kemp and others).
  • Maintain strict moderation in the space:
    • Only verifiable reporters from Gaza on mic; block persistent donation solicitations; preserve a high bar for on-the-ground claims.
  • Enforce internal process discipline before on-air disclosures to safeguard the team’s credibility and safety.