🚨#LIVE: IRAN PROTESTS

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Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfalJan 13, 2026

The Spaces convened co-hosts Sitrep and Piotr with journalist Adam Zivo and a broad panel (including Ali Reza Nader, Hazem, Stealth, Gina, Vladimir, Christopher Halali, Emre Uslu, Bradley, Azzi, Yara, and Nima) to assess fast-evolving unrest in Iran. Speakers agreed the situation has escalated from protests to an uprising, marked by an unprecedented nationwide internet blackout, widespread Starlink jamming (reportedly cutting connectivity by ~80%), and rapid deployment of IRGC ground forces. Casualty figures are unclear: Iranian state media cites 109 security personnel killed; human-rights groups report hundreds of protester deaths, while eyewitness accounts suggest thousands. Trump is being briefed on options (kinetic strikes, cyber operations, communications support), signaling increased U.S. attention and potential action; Israel and regional actors are closely monitoring. Debates surfaced around diaspora leadership claims (notably Reza Pahlavi and MEK), with consensus that on-the-ground leadership inside Iran is critical. Structural drivers—economic freefall and a severe water crisis—were emphasized as primary causes. Kurdish dynamics and regime propaganda complicate narratives on insurgency. Technical experts detailed Starlink constraints (device scarcity, roaming caps, risk exposure) and proposed emergency funding and jammer geolocation. Media coverage gaps, transnational repression, and the need for careful verification and unity were recurring themes.

Iran Uprising Twitter Space – Comprehensive Summary and Analysis

Participants and roles referenced

  • SitRep (co-host; analyst with prior government experience)
  • Adam Zivo (co-host; political columnist, National Post, Canada)
  • Piotr/Peter (co-host; geopolitical commentator)
  • Alireza Nader (Iran analyst; former RAND researcher)
  • Jules (former intelligence officer; Farsi speaker; on-ground experience during 2009)
  • Gina (Kurdish activist/observer)
  • Vladimir (analyst covering Iranian Kurds and Kurdish parties)
  • Azzie (Azi) Yazdi (Iranian-American commentator; granddaughter of Ebrahim Yazdi)
  • Stel (security analyst)
  • Hazem (U.S. national security practitioner; prior U.S. government experience)
  • Christopher Halali (analyst based in Moscow; Kurdish heritage; Russian perspective)
  • Bradley (U.S. journalist; Newsweek, DC Examiner, Washington Times, The Hill, Jerusalem Post)
  • Emre Uslu (academic; Middle East studies and political science)
  • Yara (Iranian diaspora participant in touch with networks inside Iran)
  • Dylan (Iraq-based observer)
  • Nima (Starlink logistics volunteer supporting in-country connectivity)

Executive summary

  • The panel broadly agreed that current events in Iran have escalated beyond “protests” and are better characterized as an “uprising,” driven by widespread material grievances, heavy-handed repression, and a deepening state legitimacy crisis.
  • Key escalatory indicators: a nationwide internet and phone blackout; extensive jamming of Starlink; rapid deployment of IRGC ground forces (beyond Basij and police); and reported use of heavy force including live fire. Eyewitness accounts and partial data suggest casualties significantly exceed prior cycles (2019, 2022), though precise figures remain unverifiable due to communications blackouts.
  • Casualties: State media has acknowledged 109 security personnel killed. Human rights trackers estimate hundreds of protester deaths, with some unverified eyewitness claims indicating numbers potentially in the low thousands. Caution around figures is critical given information constraints and prior misinformation episodes.
  • U.S./international posture: Multiple panelists noted stepped-up U.S. attention. President Trump (per on-plane press comments reported live) signaled “red lines,” “very strong options,” “targets you wouldn’t believe,” and intent to call Elon Musk about more Starlink for Iran. Options discussed ranged from cyber operations and communications support to limited strikes on regime security infrastructure; near-term large-scale ground action was broadly deemed unlikely.
  • Geopolitical setting: Iran’s regional position is weakened relative to recent years; Russia appears unlikely to provide major direct support beyond limited PMC-advisory roles; China’s involvement is expected to remain pragmatic and energy-focused. Regime narratives may lean on blaming foreign conspiracies and diaspora division.
  • Internal dynamics: Structural crises (inflation ~43%, currency collapse, water mismanagement, power outages) are converging with political repression. Bazaar participation and middle-class mobilization are notable. Regime coercive capacity remains formidable (IRGC, Basij), but early use of maximal measures suggests elevated threat perception.
  • Opposition leadership: Deep diaspora divisions were on display, including heated debate over Reza Pahlavi and the Iran Prosperity Project (transition plan). Some see it as a technocratic road map; others criticize legitimacy, democratic bona fides, and sectoral policies (notably water). Calls were made to stop centering exiled personalities and focus on in-country leadership and unity.
  • Kurdish theater: Conflicting claims about PJAK/Komala/PAK operations; most Kurdish groups have expressed support to protests but not claimed broad attacks. The regime highlights “terrorist” activity to justify repression and inflame nationalism.
  • Information access: Starlink remains pivotal but is heavily jammed; devices are scarce, roaming data caps limit throughput, and operator safety is a concern. Volunteers are coordinating device provisioning, setup updates, and use of VPNs (e.g., nasnet) to mitigate IP traceability. Calls were made for U.S. emergency grants to underwrite Starlink service rather than backing specific political factions.
  • Media and transnational repression: Diaspora participants described weak mainstream coverage (esp. in Canada/parts of Europe), fear of IRGC-linked intimidation abroad, and a high-risk information environment rife with propaganda and factional narratives.

Situation update and escalation indicators

  • Protest vs. uprising: Multiple co-hosts and analysts assessed this wave has surpassed prior cycles in intensity, breadth, and regime response, warranting the term “uprising.”
  • Regime threat perception and response:
    • Rapid nationwide internet shutdown and jamming of Starlink (observers estimate up to ~80% connectivity drop for Starlink at peak), combined with power cuts at night in major cities.
    • Early deployment of IRGC ground forces beyond Basij/police; reports of live rounds and heavy tactics. Some references to “collapsing floors/crowd-control” devices and live fire in dense urban settings.
    • State media acknowledges significant security force casualties (109). Local claims of senior officers killed (e.g., head of anti-narcotics police in Mashhad) surfaced.
    • Funerals in Tehran and other cities reportedly included anti-regime chants, indicating continued mobilization despite repression.
  • Casualty numbers (contested):
    • HRA News Agency (U.S.-based) listed 544 dead at time of reporting, with 579 additional reports under investigation (includes protesters, security personnel, children).
    • Iran International suggested total deaths could be ~2,000 (unverified). BBC Persian cited eyewitness accounts describing “far more than prior protests,” with some claims of mass casualties in Tehran and stacking of bodies in morgues. Panelists stressed caution: verification is severely constrained.
  • Geographic spread: Tens of thousands protesting across multiple provinces, including Tehran and Kurdish areas (Kermanshah, Ilam, Kurdistan province), with evolving participation in cities like Urmia.

Information environment, credibility, and media coverage

  • Credibility vs. propaganda: Multiple speakers urged rigorous source vetting. Regime propaganda aims to delegitimize the uprising (“foreign-backed,” “terrorists”), while external actors may amplify unverified claims. Prior misinformation (e.g., the viral 2022 “15,000 death sentences” claim) damaged credibility; panelists urged precision.
  • Mainstream media coverage: Perceived lag or under-coverage in Canada and parts of Europe (BBC initially criticized). Coverage reportedly improved after public pressure and official statements by Western leaders. Reporters cite the blackout as a constraint, but panelists called that an insufficient excuse.
  • Transnational repression: Fear among diaspora interviewees (e.g., in Toronto) to speak publicly due to potential repercussions; references to significant IRGC presence/influence networks in Western countries. Tactics include harassment, information operations, and narrative manipulation.

U.S. and international response scenarios

  • U.S. posture (breaking commentary during the space):
    • President Trump (from Air Force One) reportedly said Iran is crossing his red lines, referenced civilians “not supposed to be killed,” promised to evaluate “very strong options,” and suggested calling Elon Musk to increase Starlink provision. He warned of striking “targets you wouldn’t believe” at “levels you wouldn’t believe” if Iran retaliates against U.S. assets.
    • Panelists expect: no large-scale ground operations; likely a mix of cyber operations, precision strikes on security/communications infrastructure, expanded connectivity support (Starlink), financial interdiction (ghost fleet pressure), and proxy containment.
    • Timing: Some believe days-to-weeks; others suggest an escalation ladder rather than immediate large-scale action. Asset positioning (carrier presence) was debated, with SitRep correcting rumors (e.g., no B-52s at Al Udeid; routine tanker sorties).
  • Israel/regional: Israel likely to continue precision campaigns against Iranian proxies. Discussion of Houthis/Hezbollah capacities post-12-day war; expectations of asymmetric retaliation if Iran is struck.
  • Russia/China:
    • Russia: Christopher Halali argued Iran’s stability is strategically vital for Russia’s “soft underbelly,” but Moscow is unlikely to offer large-scale military support (resource constraints, Ukraine), limiting any role to advisors/PMCs. Russia fears a “second Yugoslavia”-style fragmentation near the Caucasus.
    • China: Pragmatic energy interests; little appetite for direct intervention. Debate on whether Iran’s fall to a “Western camp” would push Beijing to preserve ties; other panelists argued Russia/China can substitute each other for crude supply.

Regime capacity, coercion, and legitimacy

  • Coercive capacity: Estimates cited of 1–3 million Basij available, with IRGC and Artesh structures. Reports of early Artesh reluctance in prior cycles; unclear current role. Consensus that regime remains capable of severe repression.
  • Tactics reported: live fire, nighttime power cuts to facilitate repression, targeting of hospitals/medical access (landline cutoffs limiting surgeon call-ups), arrests/forced body recovery with financial extortion reported in Kurdish areas.
  • Legitimacy erosion: Inflation (~43%), currency collapse, mismanagement (especially water), and elite/middle-class disenchantment (bazaar participation) cited as key shifts. Funeral chants and sustained strikes suggest continued oppositional resolve.

Structural drivers: economy, water, and state failure risks

  • Economy: Inflation ~43% (cited), rial collapse, sanctions, proxy costs; post-12-day war isolation and revenue squeeze (ghost fleet interdiction) compounding fiscal stress.
  • Water crisis: A central driver across provinces—aquifer depletion, dam mismanagement, saline tap water, subsiding cities, agricultural collapse, electricity rationing. Panelists emphasized these are governance failures rather than ideology per se.
  • Political science lens (Emre Uslu):
    • Three conditions informing revolutionary potential:
      1. State capacity to suppress/serve (signs of weakness: blackouts/jamming, soft/hard signaling, lack of policy remedies).
      2. “Glue” between state and people (Shi’a identity/anti-West glue degraded in recent years; bazaar skepticism as a bellwether).
      3. International support (rising, but blunt external force could backfire; advocates limited surgical targeting if used at all).
    • Uslu’s outlook: Absent effective regime adaptation, long-term survival prospects are poor (he ventured “beyond 2026” as unlikely).

Opposition leadership and diaspora fragmentation

  • Reza Pahlavi and the Iran Prosperity Project (transition plan):
    • Proponents (e.g., Adam Zivo): argue inclusive, technocratic planning (economic, health, governance) built confidence among skeptical elites, offering a referendums-led transition path that calms fears of post-collapse chaos.
    • Critics (e.g., Alireza Nader, Azzie): question democratic bona fides, organizational capacity, and media-amplified elevation; allege authoritarian tendencies and poor sectoral policy (e.g., water—overreliance on desalination and Persian Gulf transfers without sustainability/groundwater fixes). Nader stressed no single person speaks for 90+ million Iranians; warned against U.S. endorsing individuals.
    • Co-hosts urged refocusing on ground realities; “we’re not there yet” on post-collapse leadership. Broad agreement that on-the-ground leadership councils need to emerge inside Iran to guide and legitimize a transition.
  • MEK/NCRI:
    • Background from Stel/Hazem: seen as a “Marxist-Islamist cult” historically; significant lobbying footprint in the West; minimal in-country legitimacy among most Iranians; removed from U.S. terror list in 2012 but widely distrusted by Iranians.
    • LA U-Haul incident: A truck bearing anti-regime/anti-monarchy slogans drove slowly into a pro-monarchist crowd area in West LA; no mass casualties reported; bomb squad called as precaution; interpreted by some as intra-diaspora provocation and a narrative gift to regime media portraying opposition “division.”

Kurdish dimension

  • Operations:
    • PJAK typically claims attacks when conducted; at time of discussion, had not claimed operations; regime media pushed narratives of “Israel-backed attacks” and alleged cross-border staging from Iraq. Komala and PAK: statements of support; PAK claimed isolated actions but with limited verifiable evidence.
    • Caution urged: Regime tends to label Kurdish activism “terrorism” to justify crackdowns and arouse nationalist sentiment.
    • Protests reportedly growing across Kurdish areas following calls for strikes; regime force deployment and casualties reported in these zones.

Technology and access: Starlink and jamming

  • Starlink status:
    • Jamming: Substantial but zonal (most intense in Tehran/large cities). Volunteers report mitigation possible through device firmware/setting updates and careful deployment tactics.
    • Devices: Estimated tens of thousands inside Iran, but many confiscated or in regime hands. Severe scarcity; roaming plans often capped at ~50GB/month, creating bandwidth rationing for video upload.
    • Safety: Starlink IP signatures can flag users on domestic sites; nasnet VPN solution reportedly helps mask Starlink-specific IPs. Device visibility (terminal “laser-pointer effect”) increases risk of confiscation.
    • Logistics: Prior movement via KRI (Iraq) noted historically; calls to avoid broadcasting smuggling routes. Landline and cellular shutdowns complicate remote setup support.
  • Policy asks:
    • Hazem urged diaspora to lobby for U.S. emergency grants to subsidize Starlink services and hardware instead of lobbying for political factions. Suggested U.S. agencies have precedent and mechanisms to rapidly underwrite connectivity.
    • Jamming geolocation and public exposure recommended to enable local action against mobile systems; non-kinetic “jamming the jammers” not feasible, but cyber options against control nodes may exist.

Media narratives and transnational repression

  • Diaspora fear: Reluctance to appear on camera or speak openly due to perceived IRGC networks abroad; panel cited large numbers of suspected operatives in North America and Europe.
  • Information ops: Use of bots/trolls, deepfakes, influencer co-option by various states (Iran, Russia, China) to suppress, distort, or crowd out accurate reporting.
  • Diaspora dynamics: Azzie highlighted “horizontal pressure” (intra-diaspora labeling—MEK, monarchist, IRGC, CIA, Mossad—often in the same week), which suffocates agency and discourages nuanced debate.

Geopolitics and regional context

  • Regional setbacks for Iran:
    • Post-12-day war dynamics have strained Iran’s proxy ecosystem and finances; maximalist regional posture costlier amid tightened ghost fleet interdictions.
    • Assad front complexity; weakening of the broader “Shia Crescent” proposition noted by co-hosts.
  • Russia: Risk-averse given Ukraine; concerned about Caucasus stability and potential jihadist flows. Likely limited to advisors/PMCs for complex system support.
  • China: Energy/security interests, but little case for overt support. Could pivot supply chains (e.g., increased Russian crude) if Iranian export pathways close.

Points of consensus and contention

  • Consensus
    • This cycle is different: faster and harsher state response; deeper structural distress; broader participation (bazaar, middle class) beyond student/youth cohorts.
    • Foreign ground intervention unlikely; support will skew cyber, ISR, comms, precision strikes if escalated.
    • Avoid overclaiming casualties; accuracy is paramount to sustain credibility.
    • Diaspora infighting undermines morale inside Iran; focus should be on enabling Iranians’ agency, safety, and communications.
  • Contention
    • Imminence of regime collapse: Some see only “cracks,” not cascading failure; others assess a terminal decline trajectory.
    • Role and legitimacy of Reza Pahlavi and his plan: Divisive; seen either as a needed road map or as an imposed personality cult lacking democratic grounding and sound sector policies.
    • Extent of Kurdish armed operations and regime’s reliance on foreign militias: Reports mixed; denials from Iraq-based sources about cross-border deployments to Iran.

Notable incidents and corrections

  • LA U-Haul incident: Provocation at a large pro-Iran protest site; no mass casualties reported; likely to be weaponized in regime media about opposition disunity.
  • Rumor control:
    • No B-52s deployed to Al Udeid per SitRep; routine tanker flights are standard ops.
    • Caution with BBC/eyewitness mega-casualty claims—treat as unverified; morgue/field evidence suggests hundreds to low thousands but verification is constrained.

Needs and suggested next steps (operational focus)

  • Inside Iran
    • Establish local leadership councils; articulate immediate goals and coordination structures; recruit technocrats and create pathways for defections.
    • Sustain dispersed, decentralized mobilization where regime logistics are stretched; document abuses with secure handling and delayed upload strategies to manage data caps.
  • Diaspora and international supporters
    • Prioritize connectivity: Lobby for U.S./allied emergency funding of Starlink devices/service; discreet logistics; support nasnet-like safety measures.
    • Information hygiene: Verify before amplifying; avoid casualty-number inflation; elevate credible local sources and rights monitors.
    • Targeted pressure: Support sanctions/enforcement on ghost fleet and revenue nodes; consider cyber options and calibrated strikes on jamming/command nodes if red lines are crossed.
    • Strategic messaging: Avoid personality-centric narratives; center Iranians’ lived grievances (water, power, food, livelihoods, dignity).

Outlook

  • Short-term (days–weeks): Expect continued repression, intermittent protests, and sporadic information flow due to jamming/blackouts. U.S. deliberations on non-kinetic and limited kinetic options likely intensify; Starlink provisioning and anti-jam efforts may scale.
  • Medium-term: Regime’s capacity to maintain prolonged blackouts is limited by economic and administrative costs, but coercive tools remain potent. Structural pressures (inflation, water, power) and bazaar/middle-class discontent point to sustained instability. Elite fractures remain the critical unknown.
  • Long-term: Several analysts assess the Islamic Republic’s long-run viability as severely compromised. Whether this cycle becomes the tipping point depends on sustaining mobilization under blackout conditions, emergence of on-the-ground leadership, and calibrated external support that empowers Iranians without handing the regime a foreign-intervention narrative.