Friday's Weekly on Saturday: Pope, Borders & Satan's Nuclear Helpers..

The Spaces reviews recent Israeli breaches along Lebanon’s southern border, with General Manish Hadi (former Lebanese government delegate to UN/UNIFIL and ex–head of the military court) asserting UNIFIL’s technical report confirms about 4,000 m² carved from Lebanese territory while the Lebanese Army is blocked from on-site verification. The host updates that 20 Lebanese nationals (mostly civilians) are held by Israel and that ICRC access is denied. A major segment covers Shebaa Farms: multiple Lebanese–Syrian judicial/technical committees and cadastral records in Saida indicate the area is Lebanese; 27 Lebanon–Syria border points require demarcation. The discussion turns to Syrian refugees in Lebanon—costs, security, environmental strain—and rejects calls to free convicted militants tried with evidence by the military court. Regionally, Hadi forecasts escalation primarily via a U.S.–Iran confrontation (with ripple effects in Yemen), notes the U.S. dropping its nuclear-testing moratorium and Russia’s signaling, and dismisses “buffer zones” as annexation. Later, contributors detail Gaza’s third winter of deprivation, aid diversion, forced transfers, and the West Bank’s settler violence, plus an East Med energy corridor backed by GCC funding and Africa resource conflicts. The Lebanese Army reportedly refused a U.S./ally request to go door-to-door dismantling Hezbollah.

Lebanon–Israel Border, Shebaa Farms, Syria–Lebanon Demarcation, Syrian Refugees/Detainees, Regional Escalation, and Gaza/West Bank Updates

Participants and Roles (as referenced in the session)

• Layla: Host/moderator of the space.
• Gen. Manish Hadi: Lebanese Army (ret.), former head of the Lebanese Military Court; served as the government’s delegate to UNIFIL and worked on the Blue Line/Shebaa Farms file.
• Nina: Regular contributor; posed questions on LAF posture and aid/ground realities in Gaza/West Bank.
• “NY” (Brother NY): Contributor; raised escalation scenarios.
• Daily Fuse News: Participant; asked outlook questions for 2026.
• Shamin: Contributor; reported on Gaza humanitarian conditions and aid dynamics.
• Others referenced: “Ola” (Saudi participant), Sarah Wilkinson (UK activist), additional activists and media personalities (discussed in context of advocacy/grift allegations).

Core Updates and Claims

1) Lebanon–Israel: Blue Line works, land carving, and UNIFIL’s technical position

• Alleged Israeli incursions: Layla stated Israeli forces have been building a concrete wall and conducting works along and inside Lebanese territory, carving out “thousands of square meters,” repeatedly citing about 4,000–5,000 m²; at one point the host characterized it as “almost 5 km²,” reflecting inconsistency in the figures. The framing across the session: incremental land grabs intended to establish outposts and consolidate control.
• UNIFIL assessment: Gen. Hadi said UNIFIL issued a technical report acknowledging Israeli breach into Lebanese territory and an area carved from the Lebanese side. He underscored UNIFIL is not usually “pro-Lebanon,” so such a finding is significant in his view.
• LAF access: According to Gen. Hadi (via Layla’s translation), the Lebanese Army was not permitted to access certain construction zones for on-the-ground verification.
• Diplomatic steps: Lebanon asked that a Military Technical Committee investigate and, per Layla, the Foreign Ministry will file a UN complaint. Both Layla and Gen. Hadi expressed skepticism the UN would act meaningfully.
• Israeli military posture: Layla relayed that Israeli forces presently hold multiple points inside Lebanese territory (she cited 5–9 points, including an outpost at Mount Hermon), with a conveyed message—attributed to Egypt’s military intelligence chief’s recent visit—that Israel will not stop aggression nor withdraw from newly held points even if Hezbollah disarms/withdraws south of the Litani. This underpins Hezbollah’s stated readiness to “resume” defending the land should state institutions fail to do so.

2) Shebaa Farms: legal status and documentation

• Governmental/Army documentation: Gen. Hadi emphasized extensive Lebanese documentation since 2000—including committees involving Army generals and submissions endorsed by the Lebanese Presidency—asserting Shebaa Farms is Lebanese.
• Historical judicial findings: Layla added that joint Lebanese–Syrian judicial committees (late 1940s–1954) issued legal findings affirming Shebaa Farms as Lebanese, later reaffirmed (circa 1960–64).
• Land registry: Ownership in Sidon’s real estate registry by Lebanese families over eight decades was cited as de facto proof of Lebanese sovereignty.
• Syrian positions: Layla said Syria has issued multiple (she cited “14”) official attestations recognizing Shebaa as Lebanese; Walid al-Muallem (Syrian FM) once affirmed this in Beirut. Per Gen. Hadi/Layla, the dispute today is primarily at the UN vis-à-vis Israel, not between Lebanon and Syria.
• Warning on external “fixes”: Layla cautioned that attempts to reframe Shebaa as Syrian—allegedly to facilitate a political “solution”—are unacceptable to Lebanon.

3) Lebanon–Syria border demarcation

• Scope of dispute: Gen. Hadi placed the Syria–Lebanon land border at roughly 370 km, identifying 27 disputed points from the north through the eastern and southeastern sectors.
• French Mandate-era anomalies: Enclaves and village carve-outs are a legacy of Mandate demarcations, leaving Lebanese residents and lands on the Syrian side and vice versa; Gen. Hadi cited a visit to al-Qasr and reports of about 40 Syrian-side villages with Lebanese-origin residents, with 15 described as originally Lebanese towns.
• Regional diplomacy: Saudis are pushing for demarcation progress; Syria is linking demarcation to other files, notably the return of Syrian refugees and the status of Syrian detainees in Lebanon.

4) Syrian refugees in Lebanon: cost, security, and banking arguments (speakers’ claims)

• Terminology and burden: Layla rejected the “internally displaced” label, insisting Syrians in Lebanon are refugees. He advanced an economic-impact estimate of about $54B in direct fiscal costs through 2020, and about $104B to date, citing subsidies (e.g., bread), infrastructure, environmental damage (sewage disposal in rivers/valleys), public security/policing, and prison overcrowding.
• Security concerns: The host reiterated early warnings (2011–2014) that militant elements entered among refugee waves, citing increases in violent crime. UNHCR was criticized for refusing to share beneficiary lists with Lebanese authorities on protection grounds.
• Syrian deposits in Lebanese banks: Layla contested claims that Lebanese banks “took” $7–10B of Syrian money; he estimated under $2B remained trapped at the onset of the 2019–20 crisis, arguing that large Syrian holdings had either been smuggled abroad by elites pre-crisis or moved to the GCC/West early on. He alleged sustained Syrian dollar outflows via Lebanese ATMs helped prop the Syrian pound until Lebanon’s banking restrictions in late 2019.
• Counter-claims on obligations: Layla argued that, given occupations, smuggling, and the refugee burden, Syria “owes” Lebanon far more than any trapped Syrian deposits, and called for refugee return before any bank-settlement discussion.

5) Syrian detainees tried in Lebanon: the military court perspective

• Court remit and standards: Gen. Hadi, as former chief of the Military Court, emphasized he tried cases based on evidence (video, confessions, witness testimony) and on internationally designated terrorist affiliations (e.g., al‑Qaeda), not on Syrian battlefield allegiances.
• Notable incidents (as recounted):
  • Ambush of a Lebanese Army SWAT team inside a refugee camp; an officer, NCO, and a soldier were captured, tied to vehicles, and dragged to death.
  • Raid on a Lebanese Army unit and Internal Security Forces in the Bekaa; dozens taken hostage; Shia and Christian servicemen reportedly segregated and executed (beheadings cited by Layla), while others were released by sect.
  • Killing of a Lebanese Army officer, Lt. Col. Jamal (full name not provided), allegedly executed in his office; video evidence was presented in court.
  • The “Abu Taqi” (Mustafa Hajiri) and his son Obaida case: a requested defense witness, once heard, implicated both in kidnappings/deliveries to a known terrorist leader, undercutting Obaida’s position.
• Policy point: Gen. Hadi said abstaining from prosecuting would have exposed Lebanon to international censure for failing to try terrorists. He pushed back against ongoing media/political campaigns to label convicts as “Islamist detainees” and press for their release/transfer.

6) Request to disarm Hezbollah via LAF (door-to-door)

• According to Nina’s question and Gen. Hadi’s response: the U.S. and allies, including Israel, allegedly asked the LAF to conduct door-to-door disarmament of Hezbollah in southern villages. Gen. Hadi stated the LAF refused. He referred to reasons, but these were not fully translated on-air.

7) “Buffer zones” vs. annexation-by-works (Syria and Lebanon)

• Gen. Hadi’s assessment: Israel is not creating temporary buffer zones but executing facts on the ground—seizing and integrating territory. He warned that purported “resistance groups” in southern Syria could be covert Israeli instruments to justify further incursions and accelerate de facto partition dynamics in Syria.

8) Regional escalation outlook and nuclear signaling

• Escalation vectors: In a Q&A with “NY,” Gen. Hadi assessed that the next major escalation would likely be U.S.–Iran, with Israeli interests driving Washington. He downplayed an imminent Saudi–Yemen restart compared to the U.S.–Iran file.
• Nuclear testing moratorium: Layla claimed the U.S. dropped its unilateral moratorium (initiated c.1992), prompting Russian countermoves and signaling (e.g., joint drills with Belarus, showcasing long-range systems, and hypersonic capabilities). The discussion framed this as a slide toward renewed nuclear brinkmanship.
• Tactical nuclear/DU concerns: Layla worried that a normalized global posture could embolden Israel’s use of depleted uranium or very low-yield nuclear devices in tightly bounded theaters. Specific recent “tests” were mentioned, but the technical accuracy and classification (e.g., thermonuclear vs. conventional) were debated among speakers.

9) Africa theater: Congo and great-power competition

• The space tied MENA dynamics to Africa: resource-driven competition (critical minerals, energy, timber) between the U.S. and Russia, with Europe’s access as the strategic prize. Qatar’s “mediation” in eastern Congo was framed as aligned with U.S. strategic preferences rather than altruism. Reports of past covert coup financing were cited as indicators of active Western involvement.

10) Gaza: humanitarian deterioration and aid controversies

• Third winter under siege and displacement: Shamin described mass exposure amid continuous rains, floods, and scarce shelter; bodies shallow-buried and sewage overflow heighten public health risks.
• Aid blockages and diversion: Claims included tens to hundreds of aid trucks blocked, diverted, looted, or shunted into private markets; “90%” of medical aid reportedly not reaching Gaza; tents allegedly stockpiled in Rafah (an Egyptian committee warehouse) rather than distributed.
• “Yellow zone” and naval fire: Continued small-arms fire and periodic naval gunnery against civilians were alleged; the “yellow zone” (a wide cordon inside Gaza) was cited as an instrument of exclusion and predation by armed gangs operating with/alongside occupying forces.
• Vaccination push: UNICEF was criticized for prioritizing vaccination campaigns while food, water, sanitation, and medical supply shortfalls remain acute; speakers warned of secondary health crises and questioned intent and sequencing.
• Promised shelter: Commitments to allow modular/mobile homes were said to be unfulfilled in early “phase” rollouts.

11) West Bank: settlers as auxiliary force and annexation progression

• Deputizing settlers: Nina cited open-source reports that National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has armed and functionally deputized settlers as a supplemental IOF arm; speakers characterized “settler violence” as, in many cases, state-directed operations.
• E1 plan and incremental consolidation: Ongoing evictions, outpost expansions, and roadblocks were cast as the steady logic of annexation. A reported policy allowing on-the-spot execution of Palestinian “hostages” was mentioned in connection with Knesset proceedings; a viral clip about discriminatory behavior during celebratory sweets distribution was cited anecdotally as evidence of intra-Israeli racial hierarchy.
• Detentions: Speakers alleged systematic mass detention, torture, and disappearance across the West Bank and Gaza; an extreme example claimed a “2‑month‑old” among hostages.

12) Energy and corridors: East Med/Gulf–Levant pipeline

• Strategic design: Layla argued that a U.S.-aligned plan predates current wars to run energy (fossil) from the UAE via Egypt/Israeli-held coast toward Cyprus and into Europe (variously conflated in public with “green” branding). The ongoing search for “second-phase” financing—purportedly routed via the UAE/Cyprus—was framed as scripted, not improvised.

13) Advocacy, disinformation, and legal repression

• Activist targeting: The space described media and lawfare campaigns, arrests, and terrorism-related charges against UK activists (e.g., Sarah Wilkinson) and claimed multi-country surveillance/intimidation of Palestinian journalists (case cited: Mustafa Ayesh’s alleged mistreatment during a Netherlands transit while carrying ICC-related materials; speakers feared rendition).
• “Grift” ecosystem: The host named individuals he accused of grifting or infiltration in Gaza-related aid and media spaces, and criticized UN agencies (WHO/UNICEF) and INGOs for practices deemed harmful or performative.

Additional Notables

• Hostage count: Layla updated that 20 Lebanese nationals are held by Israel (8 fighters and 12 civilians, per his tally), with ICRC access allegedly denied. He also raised the broader tally of “disappeared” Lebanese during the last two years, expressing hope some are alive in Israeli custody.
• Negotiations: Given alleged Israeli insistence on retaining new holdings and continuing strikes regardless of Hezbollah’s posture, speakers questioned the rationale for border negotiations under current conditions.
• Outlook to 2026 (Daily Fuse News Q): Gen. Hadi expects regional conflict to remain “open-ended,” with flare-ups moving across theaters; the U.S.–Iran confrontation is assessed as the central axis.
• Administrative: The host noted repeated delays launching the project website due to a developer issue; asked listeners to amplify/retweet and hinted at upcoming content on Monday.

Takeaways and Stakes (as articulated by speakers)

• Along the Blue Line, Israeli works have created new facts on the ground; UNIFIL reportedly documented an incursion. LAF access has been constrained. Lebanon intends to file a complaint but expects limited UN action.
• Shebaa Farms documentation is extensive on the Lebanese side; attempts to “re-Syrianize” the file are rejected. The broader Syria–Lebanon demarcation (27 points) needs resolution, but Damascus is tying it to other sensitive files (refugees, detainees).
• Speakers advanced a hard line on Syrian refugees and on convicted militants in Lebanese prisons, rejecting amnesties/transfers and asserting significant cumulative costs to Lebanon since 2011.
• Gen. Hadi positioned a U.S.–Iran clash—driven by Israeli strategic aims—as the next probable escalation, with nuclear signaling adding risk. He characterized alleged “buffer zone” discourse as cover for annexation.
• In Gaza and the West Bank, the speakers described continuing siege, famine tactics, flooding, medical deprivation, and the deputization of settlers—framing these as components of a single policy of removal and annexation.
• Beyond MENA, resource contests in Africa (e.g., eastern Congo) were presented as part of the same East–West struggle, with Qatar’s mediations depicted as U.S.-aligned instruments.

Source and Attribution Notes

• The above synthesizes the views expressed in the space. Where specific figures or incidents are cited (e.g., carved land area, detainee case details, aid percentages, hostage numbers), they reflect the speakers’ claims and recollections. Several data points (e.g., exact area carved at the Blue Line, precise aid entry rates, hostage ages/statuses, and alleged nuclear test particulars) were not independently verified in-session.