Guess who's back: Friday's Weekly Space with Gen Mounir Shehadeh

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MENA UNCENSORED
@MENAUncensoredNov 4, 2025

The Spaces reviewed two weeks of developments across Sudan, Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank, Yemen/Horn of Africa, and Syria with on‑the‑ground and military insights. Layla and the Mina Uncensored team traced Sudan’s long conflict back to Darfur (mid‑2000s), framing today’s RSF–Army war as a resource and geostrategic contest shaped by external actors (US/UK/France/Germany/Israel/UAE vs Russia/China/Qatar/Turkey), Red Sea access, and rare earths. In Lebanon, UNIFIL publicly documented Israeli drone and tank aggression; Israel signaled further escalation. A Lebanese general explained constitutional limits on the president’s army order, airpower asymmetry, expected assassinations/Mossad cells, and a likely non‑ground escalation pattern. From Gaza, reporter Samer Zainin described ongoing strikes during the “cessation,” heavy drone presence, 10,000+ still under rubble, manipulated aid entry, and a rising toll on journalists. The West Bank discussion covered PA complicity, legislation moves enabling harsher repression, mass displacement from Jenin/Nablus, and risks of intra‑Palestinian strife. The panel linked Yemen and the Horn of Africa to US–Iran dynamics and Bab al‑Mandeb control. They criticized OIC states’ trade with Israel and warned about “peacekeeping” deployments that could enable repression. The session closed with Syria’s de facto partition and HTS/Jolani’s courting of GCC capital.

MENA Uncensored Twitter Spaces – Comprehensive Notes (Sudan, Gaza/West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen/Red Sea, Syria)

Participants and roles (as referenced in the space)

  • Host/moderator: Layla (Mina Uncensored)
  • Co-host: Nina (Mina Uncensored)
  • Field reporter from Gaza: Samer Zanin (also referenced as Samer/Samar Zanyin)
  • Retired Lebanese military guest: “The General” (name not stated; former senior officer)
  • Sudanese participant: name not stated (on-ground/community perspective)
  • Nigeria participant: “Kayami” (spelling per audio)
  • US listener: Jenny
  • Team members mentioned: Shamine/Charmaine (connection issues), Sarah Wilkinson (traveling, not present)

Sudan – the players and the endgame

Strategic context (as framed by Layla)

  • Sudan is described as a long-running conflict theater (massacres noted since 2005–2008), with a persistent media blackout historically.
  • Drivers: rare earths, gold, copper, uranium, water (Nile aquifers), agriculture ("breadbasket" potential), livestock, and a critical Red Sea frontage. Control of trade lanes (Bab el‑Mandeb/Red Sea) is central to outside interest.

Principal factions and alleged sponsors (speakers’ assertions)

  • Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF/National Army): some leadership characterized as aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood; alleged support from Qatar and Turkey (e.g., drones) per Layla.
  • Rapid Support Forces (RSF): labeled "mercenary"/militia; alleged support from US, UK, Israel, UAE, France (and at times Germany) per Layla. RSF reportedly rebranded in response to crimes’ notoriety (Sudanese speaker).
  • Broader great-power contest: US/EU vs Russia/China over resources and strategic positioning.
  • Regional rivalry shaping narratives: Qatar (pro-Muslim Brotherhood) vs UAE (anti-Muslim Brotherhood), with both normalized or tacit ties to Israel in different ways (speakers’ view).

RSF origins, Yemen connection, and ethnic weaponization (speakers’ view)

  • RSF origin story: spun out from SAF; many RSF members fought in Yemen (2015–2021) under the Saudi-led coalition (Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt) and returned with combat experience (Layla citing prior Mina Uncensored sessions with Yemeni officials).
  • Ethnic/identity manipulation: speakers reject framing as “Arabs vs Africans” or “Muslims vs Christians,” characterizing it as an intelligence-led exploitation of identity ("Arabized" tribes vs others) to drive mass violence. Videos allegedly show RSF orders to "leave no one alive" (Layla).
  • The Sudanese participant emphasized: Sudan is overwhelmingly Muslim; framing of “Christians being killed by Sudan” is misinformative in the North; RSF leadership figures reportedly reside in the UAE (speaker’s claim) and have renamed/"rebranded" to obscure reputational damage.

Information environment

  • Qatar/Muslim Brotherhood media influence alleged to drive blame singularly toward UAE while minimizing roles of other state actors (US/UK/France/Israel) per Layla.
  • Speakers flagged Western statements urging "RSF self-restraint" during active atrocities as tacit greenlights to continue operations (Layla’s summary).

Horn of Africa linkage

  • Somaliland recognition and partitioning of Somalia raised as analogous external meddling (US/Israel/France/UK/UAE allegedly viewing Somaliland as independent despite lack of broad recognition).
  • Claimed Israeli base on Eritrea’s Dahlak Island in the Red Sea (speakers’ assertion); struck by Yemenis in Oct 2023, per Layla.

Gaza and the West Bank – status under “cessation of hostilities”

Gaza: battlefield reality under a nominal lull

  • Samer Zanin reported drones constantly overhead; strikes and targeted killings persist.
  • Post-lull casualty snapshot (Layla relaying local figures): ~114 Palestinians killed and >600 injured during the “cessation,” with ongoing strikes and surveillance.
  • Journalists targeted: speakers put the Gaza media worker death toll at 256 (approaching 300). Recent example cited: journalist Hamad and spouse killed when their tent was allegedly targeted.
  • Bodies/prisoners: conflicting reports around the handover of three bodies to Israel via ICRC; unclear whether Hamas, PIJ, or non-factional actors transferred them. If from Hamas, speakers estimated remaining Israeli bodies in Gaza could drop from 11 to 8 (unconfirmed).
  • Humanitarian access and famine:
    • Speakers allege Israel tightly controls what enters Gaza; many trucks labeled as “mission/merchant” cargo rather than free aid, with goods sold in markets at inflated prices.
    • Critical shortages (e.g., eggs, antibiotics) highlighted; speakers insist famine conditions persist.
    • 10,000+ people believed buried under rubble; excavation equipment remains blocked (Samer via Layla).
  • Additional tactics alleged: unmanned ground robots packed with explosives; naval fire into Gaza; settlers obstructing aid convoys with IOF complicity (speakers’ claims).

West Bank: annexation and repression (Nina’s brief and Layla’s analysis)

  • Institutionalization of brutality: speakers allege Smotrich/Ben‑Gvir leveraging Knesset to legalize torture/executions, facilitating mass detentions, extrajudicial killings, and home demolitions.
  • Settler violence and de facto annexation intensifying; church/christian community pressure noted.
  • Displacement from Jenin/Nablus: Layla cites ~50,000 still displaced; Nina believes higher. E‑1 plan and broader land-seizure discussed.
  • PA accused of collaboration: described by Layla as “traitors/sinners,” selling out land and suppressing resistance for payoff and future control in Gaza (“day after” politics).
  • Palestinian disunity: Layla’s critique that factional arrogance and lack of unified command undermine national cause; warns of intra-factional conflict in the West Bank, possibly orchestrated by Israel and backed by some Arab states.

Lebanon – legal boundaries, UNIFIL incidents, escalatory risks

Daily attrition in the south and UNIFIL episode

  • Ongoing cross-border strikes cause daily casualties; Layla cited >300 killed since the Nov 27, 2024 cessation.
  • UNIFIL statement (Oct 26, 2025) described by Layla:
    • Israeli drone approached a UNIFIL patrol near Kfar Kila and dropped a grenade.
    • Moments later, an Israeli tank fired on peacekeepers; earlier, a drone harassed a patrol and was neutralized.
    • UNIFIL called these actions violations of UNSCR 1701 and Lebanese sovereignty.
  • Clarifications (Layla):
    • UNIFIL ground patrols fall under the French battalion’s operational framework; maritime is German-led; air component rotates with Force Commander nationality (currently Spanish, per Layla’s experience, though dates shift over time).
    • Public claims that “France shot down an Israeli drone” are incorrect per Layla; it was a UNIFIL patrol from another nationality operating under French-segment authorization.

Political-legal posture in Beirut

  • Claim: Lebanon’s President (ex‑army commander) issued a directive to the Army Commander to respond to Israeli attacks. Layla stressed Lebanon’s constitution requires cabinet authority for LAF operational orders; thus, a presidential directive has moral/political weight but needs cabinet approval to be executable.
  • Cabinet’s standing guidance (per Layla): extreme restraint, engage only in direct self‑defense to avoid escalation.
  • LAF capability: strong in ground/urban warfare; lacks air power; Israel holds air supremacy thanks to Western supply. This shapes deterrence and response options.
  • MTC for Lebanon (Military Technical Committee): UK, France, US, Israel, and Lebanon participate; Layla says Western members told Beirut they won’t stop Israeli actions.

Expected escalation and tactics (The General)

  • Prediction: Israel will likely intensify pressure via air/drone strikes, targeted assassinations, and infrastructure hits (e.g., reconstruction assets) rather than ground invasion.
  • Noted incidents: an Israeli incursion to Blida’s municipal building with a fatality; strikes on bulldozers, cement yards, and assets near the Speaker’s residence as deterrent messaging.
  • Internal security: multiple Mossad espionage/assassination cells reportedly rolled up recently; further arrests expected soon (The General).

US/Israel policy signals and the Gaza deal dynamic

  • Rhetorical shift (The General): speakers noted a move from “Israel’s right to self‑defense” to “Israel’s right to revenge,” attributing the change to President Trump’s statements.
  • “Phased deal” posture: speakers contend Israel violated implementations even as POW/bodies were transferred. The resistance allegedly accepted an offer Israel/US assumed would be rejected, to expose bad faith; expectation expressed that Israel will escalate once it recovers POWs/bodies.

Yemen, Iran, Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea

  • US “endgame”: Layla framed Iran as the strategic target; US uses partners and Israel to attrit Iran’s air defense, missile stockpiles, and industrial capacities over time.
  • Iran’s capacity: strong systems (e.g., Bavar/Khordad families), but finite arsenals and output may not match attritional tempo if kept isolated.
  • Yemen: acknowledged for indigenous missile/air defense advances (including hypersonics per Layla), but also finite stockpiles/production pace.
  • Horn of Africa and SLOC security: US/Israel and allies prioritize Bab el‑Mandeb and Red Sea lanes; foreign base footprints cited (Eritrea/Djibouti) to protect east‑west trade and Israeli linkages.

OIC and normalization

  • Layla asserted: 14 of 57 OIC members trade openly with Israel; 6 more trade indirectly.
  • Claim: Malaysia and Pakistan showed no objection to contributing troops to an international force that, in practice, could enforce buffer-zone outcomes against Palestinian interests under a “peacekeeping” veneer (speakers’ skepticism that it would truly protect Palestinians).

Information war and narratives

  • The room stressed recurrent manipulation: sectarian (Sunni/Shia; “Arabized” vs “African”), religious (Christians vs Muslims) and racialized frames used to divert from resource/geostrategic motives.
  • Control over media/algorithms: speakers accused MB/Qatar of agenda-setting, and Western outlets of selective framing, shaping blame (e.g., UAE focus) while downplaying others.
  • US listener Jenny emphasized US domestic narratives (e.g., “human shields”) sustaining weapons flow; noted American-accent settlers in Congress corridors and Pentagon influence.

Nigeria tangent

  • “Kayami” said Trump designated Nigeria a “country of concern” for Christian genocide; Layla countered this broad framing, arguing most victims of terror-labeled actors in Nigeria are Muslims and warning against equating extremists with the broader community, while refocusing the space back to MENA topics.

Syria – “new frenemies” (who benefits)

  • Territorial fragmentation as described by Layla:
    • Northeast: Kurdish control
    • Northwest/parts of the Sahel: Turkish influence
    • East (oil fields): US-backed control
    • South: Israeli reach
    • Idlib: HTS/Jolani “statelet,” backed/funded historically via Qatar/Turkey channels; GCC states (Saudi/UAE) now courting Jolani, per speakers.
  • “Toxic friends” concept: Layla argues Qatar and Saudi both financed insurgency phases and now seek reconstruction spoils; Saudi reportedly invited Jolani to FII.
  • Jolani criticism: accused of conspicuous consumption and patronage building while presiding over repression and external service (speakers’ view), including earlier Israeli medical support narratives when he was aligned against Damascus.
  • The General’s security angle: Syria-based threats to Lebanon diffuse (foreign fighter groups divided; internal rivalries, including reported friction between a French African jihad figure and HTS security). Result: direct invasion of Lebanon unlikely; risk shifts to infiltration, assassinations, bombings—addressed by Lebanese security services’ recent arrests.

Lebanon’s internal cohesion principle

  • Layla underscored “Army–Resistance–People” as the security triangle since 1996: each pillar supports the other to maintain deterrence and avoid civil war.
  • The General rejected civil-war scenarios as counterproductive even for Israel; chaos via localized riots/explosions more likely than full-blown sectarian conflict.
  • Warning about manufactured “Christian vs Muslim” narratives: trivial incidents (e.g., bottled water boycotts) exploited to seed sectarian animus.

Key takeaways and highlights

  • Sudan is a resource and sea-lane battleground; RSF/SAF conflict is shaped and amplified by external sponsors, with identity narratives weaponized.
  • Gaza’s “ceasefire” is illusory per on-the-ground reporting; strikes persist, journalists are targeted, famine conditions remain intentional through access control.
  • West Bank annexation/repression escalating; PA seen as complicit by speakers; Palestinian unity remains the central strategic deficit.
  • Lebanon faces steady Israeli pressure and legal gray-zone attrition; UNIFIL incidents highlight UNSCR 1701 breaches. Cabinet authority remains decisive for LAF action; assassinations/infrastructure hits are the likeliest escalatory path.
  • US/Israel posture perceived as shifting from “self-defense” to punitive “revenge”; any handover of POWs/bodies may precede further escalation.
  • Yemen/Iran/Horn/Red Sea are linked theaters in a longer-term campaign to contain Iran and secure maritime trade.
  • OIC normalization and alleged troop contributions risk rubber-stamping buffer zones rather than protecting Palestinians, per speakers.
  • Information warfare—by regional and Western actors—systematically reframes conflicts; vigilance against sectarian/racial baiting is essential.

Open questions to watch

  • Gaza bodies/POWs: who precisely handed over recent bodies via ICRC? What remains of the list? What does that signal about intra-faction coordination (Hamas vs PIJ) and next Israeli steps?
  • Lebanon: will the cabinet shift rules of engagement for LAF? Will Israel pivot to targeted assassinations? When will authorities reveal details of newly dismantled spy rings?
  • Sudan: can any diplomatic traction emerge amid great-power competition? Will RSF rebranding alter external support or accountability? Will Horn of Africa militarization expand?
  • West Bank: scope/timing of next annexation wave (e.g., E‑1), and whether intra-factional clashes materialize as predicted.
  • Syria: how far will GCC normalization with HTS/Jolani go, and with what implications for cross-border security?

Closing sentiments (as voiced in the space)

  • Strong solidarity expressed with Palestinians and all civilians under occupation and siege.
  • A repeated call for factual rigor, rejection of manipulative sectarian narratives, and for supporting verified local reporters (e.g., follow Samer Zanin for Gaza updates).
  • Emphasis on resilience: “long live the resistance” and appeals for safety across the region, coupled with warnings that escalation cycles are likely to persist.