🌍🇸🇩The Africa Space - Episode 1 | 2026

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Wad Kosti
@waladkostiJan 8, 2026

The Spaces convened Africa-focused voices to unpack Sudan’s war, Horn of Africa geopolitics, Burkina Faso’s latest turmoil, and practical activism. Hosts and guests detailed Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe—especially in Al-Fashir—linking RSF (Janjaweed) violence, UAE support, and underreported atrocities. A substantive debate clarified RSF’s lineage: rebranding of Janjaweed into a formalized paramilitary under Bashir in 2013, never part of SAF, with roots in Darfur’s militia networks; Yemen deployments worsened RSF’s power imbalance. Discussion broadened to Red Sea chokepoints, Somaliland recognition, and how US/Israel/Gulf interests intersect with trade routes and regional control. Nina summarized a failed assassination attempt on Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré and the Sahel alliance context. Ahmed announced No Thanks app’s new Sudan campaign to enable targeted boycotts, stressing independence and humanitarian reinvestment. Hanan offered harrowing testimony of family losses and ethnic cleansing patterns in Darfur, while Benedict connected Congo’s resource-driven violence to Sudan’s plight. The Space closed with calls for weekly sessions, sharing, and community-led fact-checking and action.

Africa Space: Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and Sahel Dynamics — Summary and Notes

Opening, participants, and format

  • Technical glitches marked the start, then the space settled into a news-plus-analysis format.
  • Host/moderator: "Wad Kosti" (also called Wadi/Kosti), Sudan-focused analyst newly announced as Africa analyst for Mina Uncensored.
  • Co-host: Layla (Mina Uncensored), longtime reporter with UN DPKO experience (2007) and GCC coverage background.
  • Key speakers:
    • Abu Baker (aka "Baker", "Man of Sudan"): Sudanese advocate following the war closely with family in Sudan.
    • Nina: North African commentator; covered Burkina Faso and Sahel security/economics.
    • Ahmed: Founder of No Thanks app (boycott app); announced Sudan campaign feature.
    • Hanan: Sudanese in Canada; gave testimony of family losses and displacement.
    • Saf: Listener from Europe; Q&A on Janjaweed origins.
    • Benedict: From DR Congo; drew parallels between Sudan and Congo conflicts and external exploitation.
    • Additional contributors (names/handles not fully captured in the transcript): a co-host/producer (referred to as "Sammy/Samin"), and others who assisted with moderation and promotion.
  • Format clarification by Layla: the space separates hard news/facts from personal analysis and on-the-ground testimonials to avoid conflating sources.

Sudan: current war overview and humanitarian scale

  • Host summary (Wad Kosti):
    • War ongoing since April 15, 2023 between RSF (Rapid Support Forces) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). He asserts it is fundamentally a war by RSF against the Sudanese people, sustained by the Abu Dhabi regime.
    • Severe under-reporting despite what speakers described as the largest humanitarian crisis in modern history: 12+ million displaced. El Fasher alone cited with estimates up to 60,000 dead. Siege/occupation by militias hinders access and assessment.
  • Abu Baker’s field-informed picture:
    • Catastrophic depopulation of El Fasher: from ~1 million to ~100,000, now described as "near zero." Aid worker reports depict near-total collapse of life; people scavenge under trees and in sand for food. He framed the lack of outrage/action as a moral failure and called for grassroots mobilization, including protests at UAE embassies.
  • Why is it underreported? Abu Baker’s view:
    • A well-funded media/influence campaign allegedly led by the UAE to dehumanize the Sudanese state and smear opponents as “Muslim Brotherhood.”

RSF/Janjaweed history and the 2019 revolution: competing narratives and convergences

  • Layla’s geopolitical-historical frame:
    • Africa is rich; under-reporting serves colonial interests controlling resources. Multiple powers vie in Sudan: Russia (Wagner), US, France, UK, Germany, Qatar, UAE. Described gold smuggling, mercenary economies, and GCC rivalries (e.g., Qatar–UAE rift) as shaping Sudan’s security scene.
    • Yemen (2015 onward) was pivotal: Sudanese forces deployed; RSF personnel paid more than SAF, altering power balances; many returned and consolidated as RSF. She initially characterized RSF as a unit once within the army apparatus that later separated, and tied RSF’s growth to the Yemen campaign dynamics and GCC politics.
  • Corrections and deep-dive by Wad Kosti and Abu Baker:
    • RSF was never part of SAF. RSF is the formalized outgrowth of the Janjaweed militias, with organizational roots traceable to the late 1980s.
    • Key timeline points offered:
      • 1987: Janjaweed organizing in Darfur; rise from desert banditry/nomad militias to organized militia activity.
      • 2002–2005: Darfur war escalates; multiple militia leaders (e.g., Musa Hilal). Hemeti (Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo) emerged dominant after deposing his uncle (Hilal) mid-2000s.
      • 2008: Hemeti’s rebellion against Bashir.
      • 2013: Bashir formalizes Janjaweed as RSF, placed under NISS (not Defense Ministry). Speakers insist "rebranding" is the accurate framing, not “integration.”
    • EU/External angle: Abu Baker alleged the RSF rebrand also suited EU’s migration-control funding (referenced $200m), sanitizing the “Janjaweed” label to enable cooperation.
    • 2019 Revolution and popular consensus: Sudanese demanded "Askar lil-thakan" (military to barracks, no political/economic role) and "Janjaweed yanhall" (dissolve RSF). Speakers hold RSF refused integration into SAF and stalled the transition, culminating in war. Atrocities cited in Al-Jazira state included extreme levels of sexual violence (quoting the Darfur governor).

How Janjaweed became RSF: ideology, organization, and operations

  • Social origins and evolution (Wad Kosti):
    • Traditional nomadic banditry along desert routes escalated into organized raids on villages, cattle theft, and eventually mass violence.
    • The "Arab Gathering" (Tajammu’ al-Arabi), a political formation dating to the late 1980s, advocated Arab supremacy and state infiltration, with documents (cited by speakers) allegedly calling for control of Sudan by 2020 and urging recruitment into army, police, and intelligence.
    • 1987 "Iron Train" massacre cited as a first major organized Janjaweed atrocity after government arming of local militias ostensibly to fight southern rebels.
    • On Bashir: speakers argued he was a tool of deeper networks; while he empowered RSF (and called their creation a high point of his rule), the ideological and organizational groundwork predated him.
  • Comparative lens: Wagner Group analogy
    • Multiple speakers compared RSF’s relationship to SAF with Wagner’s to the Russian Army: a parallel power structure used for deniable operations, with eventual rivalry and breakdown. Distinctions noted, but the model of leader-aligned paramilitaries operating outside parliamentary oversight was emphasized.

Horn of Africa and Red Sea geopolitics: Israel, UAE, Somaliland, and trade chokepoints

  • The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab as strategic arteries:
    • Speakers stressed that ~12% of global trade transits the Red Sea. Control of sea lanes and ports enables leverage over states.
    • Israel’s dependency on Red Sea access (Eilat/Aqaba) and trade with Asia was highlighted, as were Saudi industrial assets along the Red Sea (Yanbu, Rabigh).
  • Current flashpoints and claims:
    • Somaliland’s recognition gambit and port politics: discussed in the context of UAE/Israel interests and Ethiopia’s seaport needs.
    • Eritrea’s Dahlak archipelago base was mentioned as an Israeli outpost allegedly struck by Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Oct 26, 2023) — presented as underreported.
    • Wider external footprints: Turkey’s presence and cooperation with Somalia (energy drilling, satellite launches), Chinese port management, and US/EU roles.
    • Speakers framed many Horn dynamics as expressions of Western colonial and Israeli expansionist policy executed via regional proxies (UAE, Ethiopia, etc.).

Burkina Faso: alleged assassination attempt on Ibrahim Traoré and Sahel realignment

  • Nina’s update and narrative:
    • A failed coup attempt in Benin (1–2 months prior) was characterized as a sloppy Western proxy effort to justify French troop return; she tied this to subsequent developments.
    • While global focus was on Venezuela’s crisis, an assassination plot against Captain Ibrahim Traoré and his inner circle in Burkina Faso reportedly unfolded and failed. Local sources cited mass civilian mobilization to the presidential palace, arrests of plotters with alleged links to ex-leader Damiba and elements in Togo. Investigations said to be ongoing.
    • Motive as framed by speakers: Traoré’s success in breaking colonial economic patterns, reclaiming resource control, and forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali and Niger threatens French and Western access to gold and other strategic minerals. More attempts are expected.
    • Geography reminder: Benin borders SE Burkina Faso; instability can spill across borders.

Q&A: Regional tensions, alliances, and RSF-linked militancy

  • Hayes (Sudan) asked:
    • Why growing tensions in the Horn among Eritrea–Sudan–Egypt vs Ethiopia–Somaliland, and the roles of Israel and the UAE?
    • Is Ethiopia justified in its seaport push if it comes at Eritrea’s expense?
    • Should Sahel countries (Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger) build a tighter alliance with Sudan given alleged linkages between RSF and armed groups across borders?
  • Responses:
    • Wadi/Layla: The Red Sea chokepoint underpins the Horn’s contest; great-power and regional-proxy interests drive alignments (Israel/US/UAE/Ethiopia). Control of maritime trade confers strategic and economic leverage. Somaliland’s recognition bid fits into these patterns.
    • Abu Baker: Sudanese authorities are aware of cross-border RSF-linked militancy; mobilization against it is “in the works.”
    • Nina: Broader coordination among African states is essential but must often proceed quietly due to pervasive foreign interference and the risk of sabotage. She added detail on Turkey–Somalia cooperation and Chinese port footprints.

Testimony: the human toll in Sudan (Hanan)

  • Hanan (from Al-Jazirah state, now in Canada) shared:
    • Family displacement from Khartoum to Al-Jazirah, then to ancestral villages amid RSF incursions. Described raids with armored vehicles, looting, demands for forced youth recruitment (50 youths), beatings (her younger brother severely beaten; still incapacitated), and a brother’s death in hospital during militia control.
    • The psychological trauma of mass casualties and unanswered losses; inability to properly mourn.
    • Characterized the Darfur violence as repeated genocide/ethnic cleansing, with RSF-backed mercenaries from neighboring countries (Niger, Chad, Libya, CAR) resettling on lands of native non-Arab tribes in Darfur. Referenced a Yale humanitarian law expert’s alarm over a “last places” scenario for Darfur’s native communities. She warned of Rwanda-like dynamics.

Parallels with DR Congo (Benedict)

  • Benedict (DRC) drew stark parallels:
    • Conflicts in Sudan and Congo are sustained by external interests exploiting resources (gold, cobalt, rare earths) via proxy forces while professing neutrality.
    • Sovereignty is denied, accountability postponed, and peace deferred as long as exploitation remains profitable.
    • Criticized selective outrage and political cover for looting; cited Rwanda and Uganda’s roles in eastern DRC on behalf of external interests, noting the sensitivity around Rwanda’s history and the misuse of that history to silence criticism.
    • Called for African solidarity, self-advocacy, and moral clarity in the face of systematic civilian suffering, displacement, and widespread sexual violence.

Activism and tools: the No Thanks boycott app

  • Announcement by Ahmed (founder):
    • A new "Sudan campaign" feature will launch in No Thanks (Android, iOS, iPad; also active across social media), developed in collaboration with Sudan-focused partners (named during space). Expected app store approvals by Monday/Tuesday.
    • No Thanks has ~14 million users; the team refuses investors and directs revenues to app operations and humanitarian aid for Gaza. Ahmed said Israeli-linked entities persistently try to acquire the app; he rejects these overtures.
    • Host/moderators emphasized using the tool to boycott products tied to complicit economies (e.g., Abu Dhabi/UAE linkages alleged by speakers) and invited crowdsourced additions to improve coverage.

Key takeaways

  • Sudan:
    • Deep consensus among speakers that RSF is the rebranded Janjaweed, not a former SAF unit; its empowerment under Bashir and its refusal to integrate into SAF precipitated the current war.
    • Underreporting is seen as the product of powerful external agendas; the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur (El Fasher, Al-Jazirah) is acute and ongoing, with genocide/ethnic cleansing claims by multiple speakers.
  • Horn of Africa:
    • The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab are central to current alignments; Somaliland/Ethiopia/Israel/UAE dynamics reflect maritime and resource strategy as much as local politics.
  • Sahel:
    • Burkina Faso’s Traoré has survived another alleged attempt; Sahel bloc consolidation (AES) is perceived as a direct threat to neo-colonial resource extraction models.
  • Activism:
    • Grassroots tools (e.g., No Thanks) are expanding to address Sudan; speakers called for mobilization, boycotts, and persistent awareness-building.

Highlights and action points

  • Highlights:
    • Detailed corrective history on RSF/Janjaweed origins and structure.
    • First-person testimony from Sudan (Hanan) grounding the human impact.
    • Cross-regional solidarity articulated by a Congolese speaker (Benedict).
    • No Thanks app to roll out a Sudan-focused feature; 14M+ user base positions it as a significant lever for economic pressure campaigns.
  • Suggested actions (from speakers):
    • Amplify accurate Sudan coverage; counter disinformation.
    • Support boycotts targeting entities/economies alleged to be sustaining RSF and similar proxies.
    • Advocate for humanitarian access, documentation, and accountability in Darfur/Al-Jazirah.
    • Build and protect African regional alliances discretely where needed, mindful of foreign interference.

Scheduling and closing notes

  • Recurrence: Weekly Africa Space every Sunday at 8 PM GMT (9 PM CET, 10 PM Jerusalem/Beirut, 3 PM EST). Host asked listeners to retweet and bring in broader audiences.
  • Disclaimers: Host emphasized openness to corrections; factual errors are his own, and he welcomes documented challenges.